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Introduction
The United States Constitution vests in Congress the power "To
promote the Progress of... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
... Inventors the exclusive Right to their... Discoveries."1 This consti-
tutional grant of power forms the basis of the federal patent statutes.2
This Note will discuss the patentability of computer software3 and pro-
pose some changes to the current patent system's treatment of computer
programs.
In order to be patentable, software must fall within a class of allowa-
ble statutory subject matter.' It then must be found useful, 5 novel,6 and
nonobvious.7 After providing some background information and sug-
gesting that sui generis legislation be created for software protection (sim-
ilar to that created for plants8 ), this Note focuses upon the
nonobviousness requirement. The discussion centers around what now
constitutes-and what should constitute-the relevant prior art9 to be
considered in determining the obviousness or nonobviousness of a
software "invention." Some methods for determining the relevant prior
art for software inventions are proposed.
The goal of these proposals is to establish a more workable system
for protecting software. Since computer software technology advances
rapidly, existing patent law is unable to accommodate software effec-
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
3. Throughout this Note, the terms "software," "computer software," and "computer
program" will be used interchangeably. A computer program is defined in § 101 of the copy-
right statutes as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer in order to bring about a certain result." Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517,
§ 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)). See infra section I(A) for further
discussion of software and related computer terms.
4. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The following five categories define allowable subject matter:
"process, machine, manufacture.... composition of matter, or ... improvement thereof." Id.
Therefore, patentable items are generally referred to as either processes or products, and
software patents usually treat software as a process. Since a computer essentially becomes a
special purpose machine when a computer program is loaded into its memory, some software
patent applications take advantage of the machine category of statutory subject matter.
5. Id. § 101. See infra note 95 for further discussion of this requirement.
6. Id. § 102. See infra note 95 for further discussion of this requirement.
7. Id. § 103. See infra note 95 for further discussion of this requirement.
8. See infra note 92 for a description of plant patents.
9. The term "prior art" refers to "[a]nything in tangible form that may properly be relied
upon by the Patent [and Trademark] Office under the [p]atent [s]tatutes ... in support of a
rejection on a matter of substance, not form, of a claim in a pending application for patent."
Borden, Inc. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 1178, 1203 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (em-
phasis in original) (citation omitted). For discussion of prior art as it is used in this Note, see
infra note 117.
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tively.1° The proposals in this Note are designed to ease some of the
unrest which presently surrounds patent protection of software.
This Note's proposals involve slightly modifying the existing intel-
lectual property concepts, and then incorporating these modified con-
cepts into new statutes specifically designed to handle the unique
concerns of the computer software industry. Since statutory change in-
variably raises interpretive questions, using existing concepts as a corner-
stone for sui generis software legislation could avoid extensive
interpretive confusion, while lending respectability to the suggested
changes. Blending established concepts from several areas with novel
ideas may produce a system that is not only more conducive to meeting
the unique demands of software patents but is also more readily accepted
by the intellectual property bar. Although the law is dynamic, the inertia
of human nature is always an important consideration; a combination of
familiar concepts and language, rather than an infusion of radical modifi-
cations, should ease acceptance.
Since the definition of "software" appears to expand and contract at
the will of the person using it, Part I of this Note begins by defining
terms. Various definitions of the term "software" and related computer
terms are discussed, and then a definition of "software" for purposes of
this Note is provided. Next, the various roles that software can play in
an invention (e.g., the software can be an element in a "combination in-
vention," 11 or it can constitute the "invention" in and of itself) are
discussed.
Part II of this Note delves into the threshold issue of whether
software constitutes patentable subject matter. This is still controversial;
therefore, it must be addressed before the subissues of nonobviousness
and prior art can be discussed effectively. For this reason, various defini-
tions of the term "algorithm" will be addressed. These diverse defini-
tions created a hurdle that had to be cleared before software patents were
allowed. After addressing this concern, Part II discusses the effect that
10. See infra note 61 for articles discussing the unrest surrounding patent protection of
software.
11. Combination inventions are inventions composed of various items or components. In
order to obtain a patent on the combination, the individual items or components need not be
patentable. The "invention" is found in the resulting combination.
A "combination patent" is one in which none of the parts or components are new,
and none are claimed as new; nor is any portion of the combination less than the
whole claimed as new or stated to produce any given result. The combination, as
arranged in reference to each other, is stated to be the improvement and the thing
patented. It is a novel union of old means designed to achieve new ends.
Borden, Ina, 381 F. Supp. at 1202 (citations omitted). For further information about combi-
nation patents, see infra note 25 and accompanying text and infra text accompanying note 55.
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the landmark case of Diamond v. Diehr 2 had in the area of software
patents. Finally, section II(C) points out some current concerns and
controversies surrounding software patentability.
Part III builds on the preceding parts by assuming that software is
patentable subject matter. It then focuses on the statutory requirement
of nonobviousness' 3 and the relevant prior art that should be considered
when making nonobviousness determinations. Although several aspects
of the existing patent laws arguably should be altered, 4 especially with
regard to rapidly changing technologies such as computer software, this
Note focuses on the narrow area mentioned above.
Finally, Part IV discusses some proposals for changing what consti-
tutes prior art in the area of software patents.
I
Software and the Roles it Can Play in an Invention
A. Software, Hardware, Firmware, and Slushware
The term "software" has a variety of meanings.' 5 It is most often
considered to be synonymous with "computer program."' 6 When used
in this way, the term "software" does not always refer to source code;'
7
for example, it is sometimes used to refer to object code.'" The term
12. 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (5-4 decision).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
14. For example, no greater than double damages should be allowed, although prejudg-
ment interest on any recovery should remain available. The patent system is designed to pro-
vide incentive to invent, not to litigate. As it stands now, it is attractive for outside entities to
buy patent rights solely in contemplation of litigation for profit. The currently available treble
damages provide a lucrative incentive for this type of action, which contravenes the purposes
of the patent system. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988) for a discussion of prejudgment interest and
treble damages in patent suits.
For more information relating to the purposes of the patent system, see infra note 81.
15. See Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Ap-
ply?, 35 EMORY L.J. 853, 866-67 nn.54 & 56 (1986) (discussing the myriad definitions of the
term "software").
16. Mislow, Computer Microcode: Testing the Limits of Software Copyrightability, 65
B.U.L. REV. 733, 736 n.3 (1985). This is how the term "software" will be used in this Note.
17. Source code includes the actual words written by computer programmers using the
commands from one of many available programming languages, which include BASIC ("Be-
ginner's All-purpose Symbolic Instruction Code"), C, COBOL ("COmmon Business-Oriented
Language"), Forth, FORTRAN ("FORmula TRANslator"), LISP ("LISt Processor"), Logo,
Modula-2 ("MODUlar LAnguage 2"), Pascal (This language is named after "[t]he mathemati-
cian, Blaise Pascal, [who] is credited with inventing the world's first digital calculating
machine."), and PILOT ("Programmed Inquiry, Learning[,] Or Teaching"). C. TAYLOR, THE
MASTER HANDBOOK OF HIGH-LEVEL MICROCOMPUTER LANGUAGES 19, 46, 86, 126, 160,
197, 227, 254, 297, 331 (1984).
18. Object code results from "compiling" the source code, which converts it into the bi-
nary strings of Is and Os ("machine language") that the computer's microprocessor under-
stands. C. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 1-2.
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"software" has even been interpreted to encompass any documentation
and engineering support that comes with a computer program.19
"Software" is easily distinguished from "hardware," which is proba-
bly the most familiar and is definitely the least computer-specific of the
terms "software," "hardware," "firmware," and "slushware." "Hard-
ware" describes the physical components (e.g., nuts, bolts, screws, key-
boards, disk drives, and central processing units (CPUs)) of the computer
and other equipment (e.g., printers, monitors, modems, mice, joysticks,
and track balls) used for communication and data processing.2' The dis-
tinction between software and hardware gets fuzzier as one moves into
the areas of "firmware" and "slushware," since these areas are more
closely related to software than is hardware.
"Firmware" describes a hardware implementation of software in
ROM 2 chips ("ROMs"), memory units that maintain their data when
the computer's power is turned off. The computer programs in these
ROMs are typically "workhorse" routines rather than application pro-
grams, such as word processors, spreadsheets, and database manipula-
tors. Workhorse programs generally function as go-betweens that are
accessed by the application programs to control the hardware. Although
firmware typically involves workhorse programs, ROMs can also incor-
porate application programs, such as those mentioned above or video
games (e.g., most arcade video games are implemented in ROMs).
"Slushware" is a new term recently coined by Zenith Data Systems
to describe "a combination of software and firmware ... that shadows
the [slow] 8-bit ROM into [fast 16-bit or] 32-bit RAM."12 2 Briefly, the
19. See, e.g., University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 527
n.2 (5th Cir. 1974); Honeywell, Inc. v. Lithonia Lighting, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 406, 408 (N.D.
Ga. 1970); First Nat'l Bank v. Department of Revenue, 85 Ill. 2d 84, 86, 421 N.E.2d 175, 176
(1981).
20. For more information about computers and computer terms, see generally A. FREED-
MAN, THE COMPUTER GLOSSARY (4th ed. 1989); J. ROSENBERG, DICTIONARY OF COM-
PUTERS, INFORMATION PROCESSING, AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2d ed. 1987); P. BURTON,
A DICTIONARY OF MINICOMPUTING AND MICROCOMPUTING (1982); DICTIONARY OF COM-
PUTING: DATA COMMUNICATIONS, HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE BASICS, DIGITAL ELEC-
TRONICS (F. Galland ed. 1982); C. SIPPL, MICROCOMPUTER DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1981); C.
SIPPL, COMPUTER DICTIONARY AND HANDBOOK (1980).
21. ROM is an acronym for Read-Only Memory. It is "[a] computer's internal memory
where fixed data, such as the operating system, is stored. The user may read it but not alter
it." A Glossary of Computer Technology Terms, Am. Banker, Oct. 25, 1989, at 10, ol. 1. "Its
contents are placed into the [chip] at the time of manufacture .... A. FREEDMAN, supra
note 20, at 597-98.
22. Grunin, 33-MHz 386: Zenith Breaks the Ice; Hardware Review, PC MAGAZINE, May
30, 1989, at 33. See supra note 21 for a description of ROM. RAM is an acronym for Ran-
dom Access Memory, which is the computer's working memory. Computer programs are
temporarily stored in RAM during execution. When a computer is turned off or loses power,
all the information in this temporary storage area is lost. For further discussion of RAM, see
1990]
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terms "8-bit," "16-bit," and "32-bit" indicate data transfer rates; the
higher the number, the faster data transfer can potentially occur. The
ROM in a personal computer generally uses 8-bit data transfer, whereas
the RAM typically uses either 16-bit or 32-bit data transfer, depending
on the processor chip being used. Therefore, Zenith's slushware, by tem-
porarily copying (i.e., "shadowing") the slow 8-bit ROM into fast RAM
(either 16-bit or 32-bit), increases the speed at which the computer can
operate.
These definitions illustrate how difficult it can be to determine ex-
actly what is meant by the term "software." This Note adopts what is
arguably the term's most common definition. "Software" will be used to
describe a computer program in object code or source code format, and
this definition will not encompass hardware, engineering support, or doc-
umentation. The other terms have been defined so that the reader can
distinguish them from the term "software" as it will be used in this Note;
but the remainder of the Note concerns only "software," and the other
terms will not be discussed further.
The next two sections discuss the various roles that software can
play in an invention. The software can constitute one element of a larger
invention, or it can constitute the invention in and of itself.
B. Invention Incorporating Software
"Combination inventions"23 often unite public domain items.24 The
Supreme Court is concerned that unless more than a mere combination
of old elements is present, a patent on the combination merely reduces
the pool of public domain items without providing public benefit.25 Such
A. FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 576. For more about slushware, see Brown, Zenith Data
Systems Zenith Z; Hardware Review One of 58 80386-based Microcomputer Evaluations, PC
MAGAZINE, May 30, 1989, at 316; Danca, Desktop III Bidders Show 25-MHz 80386 Machines;
Air Force Desktop III Procurement, Gov'T COMPUTER NEWS, May 1, 1989, at 17; Mace,
Zenith's 25-MHz, Zero- Wait-State 386 Features 32-Bit Superset Bus, InfoWorld, Feb. 27, 1989,
at 25, col. 3; Rosch, Zenith Z; Hardware Review One of Three Evaluations of 386-based
Microcomputers From Wyse, Mitsubishi and Zenith, PC MAGAZINE, May 31, 1988, at 288;
Chandler, Zenith Adds Faster, Smaller Units to 80286 Desktop Line, PC Week, May 31, 1988,
at 37, col. 1; Zenith Intros 286-Based Desktop Systems; Zenith Data Systems, COMPUTER AND
SOFrWARE NEWS, May 23, 1988, at 32.
23. See supra note 11 for a discussion of "combination invention."
24. Public domain items include those on which the patents or copyrights have expired
and those which were never patentable or copyrightable. A member of the public can use,
modify, copy, or sell any of these items without first obtaining the permission of, or attributing
the work to, its creator.
25. In Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976) (unanimous Court), the United
States Supreme Court discussed a "synergism" requirement for a combination patent. Id. at
282. Obviously, it is harder to get a patent when you must demonstrate a greater total effect
from the combination of elements than from the sum of the effects of the elements taken inde-
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uncompensated reduction in the public's pool of resources is contrary to
the intent of patent legislation.26 For this reason, combination patents
are granted with reservation.27
However, software patentability is not as controversial in this area
because the individual elements of a combination invention do not have
to be separately patentable to be eligible for a patent on the combina-
tion.28 Thus, a patent can be granted for a combination invention involv-
ing a computer program regardless of whether the program is separately
patentable. In fact, Diamond v. Diehr, 29 the seminal case in the area of
software patentability, concerned a combination invention for rubber
curing that included a computer program. In Diehr, the Supreme Court
held that "a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a ... computer program."30
Diehr is discussed further in section II(B).
C. Pure Software Invention
The sphere of real controversy and the primary focus of this Note is
the pure software patent, which is a patent that an inventor has obtained
or is attempting to obtain based solely on the software implementation of
a process. This is a very different situation from the combination patent
scenario discussed above. To get a patent on the software alone, the
software must meet the stringent statutory requirements for a patent.
31
pendently. Therefore, the synergism requirement makes it much more difficult to patent a
combination and to thereby withdraw the items combined from the public domain.
In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147
(1950), the United States Supreme Court stated the following:
Patents cannot be sustained when.., their effect is to subtract from former resources
freely available to skilled artisans. A patent for a combination which only unites old
elements with no change in their respective functions... obviously withdraws what
already is known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available
to skillful men.
Id. at 152-53. See supra note 11 for discussion of "combination invention."
26. "Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove exis-
tent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already avail-
able." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
27. See, e.g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 152 ("Courts should scrutinize
combination patent claims with a care proportioned to the difficulty and improbability of find-
ing invention in an assembly of old elements.") (emphasis added); Bobertz v. General Motors
Corp., 228 F.2d 94, 98 (6th Cir. 1955) ("quite a high standard of invention is now exacted to
sustain combination claims embracing old elements in a patent"), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824
(1956).
28. See supra note 11 for discussion of "combination invention."
29. 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (5-4 decision).
30. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
31. The statutory requirements for a utility patent are discussed further infra note 95.
This is the most common type of patent issued for software inventions. See Bulkeley, Will
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Although pure software inventions are receiving utility patents,
32
software has not always been accepted as patentable subject matter.
II
Establishing That Software Constitutes Patentable
Subject Matter
To address the subissues of nonobviousness and prior art effectively,
the threshold issue of whether software constitutes patentable subject
matter must be addressed.
A. The Various Meanings of "Algorithm"
Algorithms are an integral part of computer programming.33 Since
the courts have determined that certain types of algorithms are not pat-
entable,34 much of the controversy surrounding the patentability of com-
puter programs stems from the meaning of "algorithm" when that term
is used to describe a computer program. The judicially created exception
for some algorithms has even confused "[tihe Patent and Trademark Of-
fice [(PTO), which] initially took the view that computer programs were
Software Patents Cramp Creativity?, Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1989, at BI, col. 3 (most software
companies describe their programs as "processes" in order to obtain a utility patent on them).
32. See infra note 56 for some examples of software utility patents.
33. See Raskind, The Uncertain Case For Special Legislation Protecting Computer
Software, 47 U. PiTr. L. REV. 1131, 1174 (1986) ("[a]lgorithms and computer languages are
the basic elements of software").
Before a programmer can write a computer program, the desired result must be ascer-
tained, and the starting point (Le., the information to be used in attaining the desired result)
must be established. A set of instructions or steps that allows the programmer to get from the
starting point to the desired result efficiently is then written. This set of instructions that
reaches a desired result is what this Note refers to as an algorithm. To create effective and
efficient software, well-developed algorithms are an absolute prerequisite to the actual pro-
gramming in the selected source code language. See supra section I(A) for discussion of com-
puter terminology.
34. See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186 ("[S]uch an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is
like a law of nature, which cannot be the subject of a patent."); In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370,
1374 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[Mjathematical algorithms and abstract mathematical formulae ....
like the laws of nature, are not patentable subject matter.") (emphasis in original); see also
Andrews, Patents on Equations: Some See a Danger, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1989, at D1, col. 4
("In the past, the courts have ruled that mathematical equations could not be patented because
they were similar to the laws of nature and to claim a patent would be like trying to patent a
fundamental truth, like the nature of gravity." Id. at col. 5).
No explicit exceptions to patentable subject matter are presented in the "Inventions Pat-
entable" section of the patent statutes. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Contra 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1988) (This subsection of the copyright statutes describes some areas to which copyright pro-
tection does not extend, stating that "[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illus-
trated, or embodied in such work.").
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not patentable because they could be characterized as sequences of
mental steps and/or mathematical algorithms."" However, "[t]he judi-
cially-created exception to [section] 101 [of the patent laws] applies only
to mathematical algorithms since any process is an 'algorithm' in the
sense that it is a step-by-step procedure to arrive at a given result."36
Since processes are specifically enumerated as allowable statutory subject
matter,37 too broad a definition of "algorithm" would exclude by impli-
cation subject matter that is explicitly listed as patentable.
Algorithms are often described as step-by-step processes, typically
expressed as formulas that solve mathematical problems to achieve a par-
ticular result.38 When "algorithm" is used to describe such processes, it
describes patentable subject matter,39 the tools being used to solve a
problem. On the other hand, if one is using "algorithm" in its narrow
sense to describe a universal truth (e.g., a mathematical relationship that
someone discovers but does not invent), it should not be patentable, just
as scientific truths and the laws of nature are not patentable.' There-
fore, patentable "algorithms" (processes that solve problems) are essen-
tially composed of nonpatentable "algorithms" (mathematical truths that
are discovered but not invented). This is not surprising. When broken
down far enough, all inventions are composed of natural elements that
use the laws of nature to achieve their intended purposes.
Although it is difficult to draw distinctions based on the use of a
word, the courts do not face an insurmountable task as they distinguish
35. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1075 (1989). For an example of a court comparing a computer program
to nonpatentable mental processes, see In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A.
1951).
36. PTO Publishes Analysis of Patentable Software, 38 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) 551, 551 (Sept. 21, 1989) (summary of a paper on the patentability of mathematical
equations and computer software that was prepared by Associate Solicitor Lee E. Barret and
presented to the patent examiners) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter PTO Publishes Analysis].
37. For discussion of patentable subject matter, see supra note 4.
38. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 35, at 1056 n.54 ("An algorithm is a step-by-step proce-
dure for achieving a particular result" and is "typically expressed as formulas for solving
mathematical problems."); Kolata, Mathematicians Are Troubled by Claims on Their Recipes,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1989, § 4, at 26, col. 1 (an algorithm is "the step-by-step recipe for
carrying out a mathematical calculation."); Andrews, supra note 34, at D6, col. 2 ("Mathemat-
ical algorithms are step-by-step procedures to solve complicated numerical problems and usu-
ally employ novel strategies that can be translated into computer code to solve problems.").
39. See, e.g., Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PiTr. L. REV. 959 (1986)
(novel and nonobvious algorithms should be patentable); Gemignani, Should Algorithms Be
Patentable?, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 326 (1982) (algorithms should be patentable); Newell, Re-
sponse: The Models Are Broken, The Models Are Broken/, 47 U. PIrr. L. REV. 1023 (1986)
(response to Professor Chisum's article cited supra this note). For discussion of patentable
subject matter, see supra note 4.
40. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) ("a scientific
truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable invention").
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attempts to patent mere mathematical relationships from attempts to
patent "processes" that solve particular problems. Recently, the Federal
Circuit 4 ' demonstrated the ability to distinguish patentable from nonpat-
entable algorithms.
In Iwahashi, 42 the Federal Circuit reversed the United States Patent
and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (the
Board) and held that an auto-correlation unit that operated according to
an algorithm was patentable. The court discussed the difference between
a patentable "algorithm," or step-by-step process, and a nonpatentable
mathematical "algorithm.9
43
In Grams," the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Board
to reject the claims in a patent application as describing nonstatutory
subject matter. The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that the
only physical step in the claims was to collect data for a data analysis
mathematical algorithm.45 Therefore, the claim was not directed toward
statutory subject matter.46
Since the issue of algorithm patentability has been a stumbling block
for software patents, 47 Iwahashi is an important case supporting the view
that software, as it relates to algorithms, is patentable. Although this
recent decision is likely to be important to inventors seeking software
patents, the earlier Supreme Court case of Diamond v. Diehr" is the
seminal case for software patentability and, therefore, must be considered
in any analysis of current law in this area.
B. The Effect of Diamond v. Diehr
The genesis of software patentability stems primarily from the
Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Diehr. 49 Diehr involved a com-
41. On October 1, 1982, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit began
hearing all patent appeals. In addition to some other responsibilities, the Federal Circuit has
exclusive, nationwide jurisdiction of patent appeals and has had this jurisdiction since its crea-
tion. See Act of Apr. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 37 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295
(1988)); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 141-146 (1988) (these sections cover the procedures that must be
followed to get a PTO decision reviewed).
42. In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
43. Id. at 1374.
44. In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
45. Id. at 839.
46. Id. at 840.
47. See, e.g., Maier, Software Protection-Integrating Patent, Copyright and Trade Secret
Law, 28 IDEA 13, 14-15 (1987); Moskowitz, The Metamorphosis of Software.Related Invention
Patentability, 3 COMPUTER/L.J. 273, 282 (1982).
48. 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (5-4 decision).
49. Id.
Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981) (per curiam), mem. aff'g by an equally divided
Court In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807 (C.C.P.A. 1979), was argued the same day as Diamond v.
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bination patent5° on a process that calculated the curing time in a rubber-
curing operation in which a computer program was a distinguishing ele-
ment. The Court held that "a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathe-
matical formula, computer program, or digital computer."51 Since Diehr,
it is generally acknowledged that computer software constitutes patenta-
ble subject matter,52 even though there has been no Supreme Court rul-
ing on the validity of a pure software patent.53 However, with the
Supreme Court's ultimate view on the issue still locked in the minds of
the Justices, it remains to be seen whether the Court will uphold a pure
software patent.
The holding in Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulation
Co. 54 suggests that the validity of software patents should not be based
upon Diehr. In Mercoid, the Supreme Court held as follows:
The fact that an unpatented part of a combination patent may distin-
guish the invention does not draw to it the privileges of a patent. That
may be done only in the manner provided by law. However worthy it
may be, however essential to the patent, an unpatented part of a com-
bination patent is no more entitled to monopolistic protection than any
other unpatented device.55
Applying Mercoid to Diehr, the unpatented software of Diehr may
not be entitled to patent protection. The computer program in Diehr was
one of several elements in a combination utility patent on a process.
Since the individual elements of a combination patent need not be sepa-
Diehr. In Bradley, the Court upheld a patent involving firmware that allowed direct communi-
cation with a computer's internal registers ("A register is a small, high-speed memory circuit
that holds addresses and values of internal operations. For example, registers keep track of the
address of the instruction being executed and the data being processed." A. FREEDMAN, supra
note 20, at 586 (emphasis in original). "An address is the number of a particular memory or
peripheral storage location. Every byte of memory... [has its] own unique address just like a
post office box." Id. at 9 (emphasis in original)).
50. See supra note 11 for discussion of "combination invention."
51. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187 (emphasis added).
52. See PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, MANUAL
OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106 (Rev. 12) (July 1989) (PTO procedure for re-
viewing applications for patents on computer programs); see also L.J. KUTrEN, COMPUTER
SOFTWARE PROTECTION/LIABILITY/LAw/FORMS, § 3.03[l 1], at 3-35 (Release No. 1, May
1988) ("there is no doubt that some software is patentable"); Higgins, Technological Poetry:
The Interface Between Copyright and Patents for Software, 12 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 67,
80 (1989) ("technological aspects of software are now clearly protectable with patents");
Lundburg, Sumner & Michel, Twelve Myths About Patent Protection for Software, A.B.A. SEC.
Sci. & TECH., Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 2; Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software,
39 STAN. L. REv. 1329, 1350 (1987) (patent protection is available for computer programs);
Sumner & Lundburg, The Versatility of Software Patent Protection: From Subroutines to Look
and Feel, THE COMPUTER LAw., June 1986, at 1.
53. PTO Publishes Analysis, supra note 36, at 552.
54. 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
55. Id. at 684.
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rately patentable, it follows that merely allowing a patent on the combi-
nation in Diehr does not directly imply that the Supreme Court would
uphold a patent on the software alone.
It is therefore possible to conclude that too much is being read into
Diehr, and it stretches reason to conclude that the Court would uphold a
software patent based solely on Diehr. Nevertheless, since Diehr, the
PTO has been "actively processing and issuing software patents.",
5 6
56. G. DAVIS III, SOFTWARE PROTECTION: PRACTICAL AND LEGAL STEPS TO PRO-
TECT AND MARKET COMPUTER PROGRAMS 158 (1985).
The following are examples of software utility patents:
* U.S. Pat. No. 4,903,206, entitled "Spelling Error Correcting System" (Feb. 20,
1990) (assigned to IBM Corp.).
* U.S. Pat. No. 4,823,108, entitled "Display System and Memory Architecture and
Method for Displaying Images in Windows on a Video Display" (Apr. 18, 1989)
(assigned to Quarterdeck Office Systems).
" U.S. Pat. No. 4,744,028, entitled "Methods and Apparatus for Efficient Resource
Allocation" (May 10, 1988) (assigned to American Tel. and Tel. Co., AT&T Bell
Laboratories).
" U.S. Pat. No. 4,736,308, entitled "Search/Retrieval System" (Apr. 5, 1988) (as-
signed to Quickview Systems).
* U.S. Pat. No. 4,730,252, entitled "Document Composition From Parts Inventory"
(Mar. 8, 1988) (assigned to IBM Corp.).
* U.S. Pat. No. 4,674,065, entitled "System For Detecting and Correcting Contex-
tual Errors in a Text Processing System" (June 16, 1987) (assigned to IBM Corp.).
• U.S. Pat. No. 4,649,499, entitled "Touchscreen Two-dimensional Emulation of
Three-dimensional Objects" (Mar. 10, 1987) (assigned to Hewlett-Packard Co.).
" U.S. Pat. No. 4,646,256, entitled "Computer and Method for the Discrete
Bracewell Transform" (Feb. 24, 1987) (assigned to The Board of Trustees of the
Leland Stanford Junior University).
* U.S. Pat. No. 4,646,250, entitled "Data Entry Screen" (Feb. 24, 1987) (assigned to
IBM Corp.).
* U.S. Pat. No. 4,555,775, entitled "Dynamic Generation and Overlaying of
Graphic Windows For Multiple Active Program Storage Areas" (Nov. 26, 1985)
(assigned to AT&T Bell Laboratories).
" U.S. Pat. No. 4,486,857, entitled "Display System for the Suppression and Regen-
eration of Characters in a Series of Fields in a Stored Record" (Dec. 4, 1984)
(assigned to Quickview Partners).
" U.S. Pat. No. 4,464,652 entitled "Cursor Control Device For Use With Display
Systems" (Aug. 7, 1984) (assigned to Apple Computer, Inc.).
" U.S. Pat. No. 4,456,969, entitled "System For Automatically Hyphenating and
Verifying the Spelling of Words in a Multi-Lingual Document" (June 26, 1984)
(assigned to IBM Corp.).
" U.S. Pat. No. 4,374,408, entitled "Multi-pass System and Method For Source to
Source Code Translation" (Feb. 15, 1983) (assigned to Burroughs Corp.).
" U.S. Pat. No. 4,355,371, entitled "Instantaneous Alpha Content Prescan Method
For Automatic Spelling Error Correction" (Oct. 19, 1982) (assigned to IBM
Corp.).
" U.S. Pat. No. 4,346,442, entitled "Securities Brokerage-Cash Management Sys-
tem" (Aug. 24, 1982) (assigned to Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.).
This patent was litigated and upheld. See Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983).
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While the United States Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of federal
statutes such as the patent laws, the PTO's interpretation of the patent
statutes should be given a great deal of judicial deference." Some district
courts have accepted that software constitutes patentable subject mat-
ter.5" This "patent protection applies to the underlying process, not to
the program or software." 59
With the subject matter issue thus apparently resolved, the first hur-
dle to obtaining a software patent-convincing the PTO and the courts
that software is patentable subject matter-is de minimis; this Note relies
upon this basic premise.
C. Current Concerns and Controversies
Since software technology changes so rapidly, the sluggish conven-
tional patent system is faltering in this field, and the public for whom the
patent system exists' is questioning the wisdom of patent protection for
software. Both the media and software industry are dissatisfied with the
" U.S. Pat. No. 4,328,561, entitled "Alpha Content Match Prescan Method for Au-
tomatic Spelling Error Correction" (May 4, 1982) (assigned to IBM Corp.).
" U.S. Pat. No. 4,309,756, entitled "Method of Automatically Evaluating Source
Language Logic Condition Sets and of Compiling Machine Executable Instruc-
tions Directly Therefrom" (Jan. 5, 1982) (invented by Robert I. Beckler).
" U.S. Pat. No. 4,308,582, entitled "Precursory Set-up For a Word Processing Sys-
tem" (Dec. 29, 1981) (assigned to IBM Corp.).
57. See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (Since "[t]he Federal Communications
Commission is... entrusted by Congress with... implementing and enforcing... the Com-
munications Act ... , [the FCC's] construction of the statute is entitled to judicial deference
'unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong.'" Id. at 390 (quoting Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969)). This may not be what actually occurs, as
many patents are invalidated by the courts. See infra note 110.
58. See, e.g., In re Pardo 684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983) (subse-
quently settled pursuant to confidential agreement). For further discussion of Paine, Webber,
see Note, Paine, Webber, Jackson and Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith:
Methods of Doing Business Held Patentable Because Implemented on a Computer, 5 Com-
PUTER/L.J. 101 (1984) (authored by David I. Meyer); Note, The Patentability of Computer
Programs: Merrill Lynch's Patent for a Financial Services System, 59 IND. L.J. 633 (1984)
(authored by Lynne B. Allen). For further discussion of court decisions after Diehr, see Milde,
Life After Diamond v. Diehr: The CCPA Speaks Out on the Patentability of Computer-Related
Subject Matter, 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 434 (1982) (This Article deals with decisions handed
down before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created. See supra
note 41.).
59. PTO Publishes Analysis, supra note 36, at 552.
60. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("[T]he pat-
ent statutes[ ] make[ ] reward to the owner a secondary consideration."), cited with approval in
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); cf Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127
(1932) ("The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the [copy-
right] monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public .... ").
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current system's treatment of software patents.61 Advances in software
appear to be accelerating geometrically as software itself is used to design
smarter, quicker, and more capable software, which in turn is used to
design even more advanced software.62 While the technology presses for-
ward, delays in the patent application process 63 prevent software devel-
opers from knowing who invented what first. The unattended and
confidential" applications can be dormant menaces for software develop-
ers. A problem arises if developers independently "invent" and use a
patentable computer program, without realizing that the patentable sub-
ject matter of their program has already been invented and has a patent
pending for it. The subsequent developers may become infringers if the
prior inventor's patent issues, since a utility patent owner has, among
other rights, "the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling
the invention.
65
When the likelihood that subsequent inventors will create poten-
tially infringing inventions-and spend a great deal of time and money
developing these inventions-is coupled with the delays at the PTO,6 6
the concerns of the software industry become more understandable. The
primary concerns are that software patents tie up technology and that
the public is deprived of a fair return for the patent power being
61. See, e.g., Lewis, The Executive Computer; All's Not Quiet on the Legal Front, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 26, 1989, § 3, at 8, col. 1 ("The established legal concepts of patent and copyright
are not yet elastic enough to fully cover ... nebulous computer-age products .... ). See
generally Bulkeley, supra note 31.
62. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
A COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 10-15 (1984); see also
Rodau, supra note 15, at 853 nn.3 & 4, 855 n.7 (discussion of the growth of the computer
industry); Menell, supra note 52, at 1329-30 (from 1978 to 1986 "computer software revenues
grew at an annual rate of more than 20 percent").
63. See 1986 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS 45 (Jan. 1987).
Although the number of patent applications that are filed generally increases each year, the
pendency time of an average patent application has been decreasing. For example, in 1984,
1985, and 1986, the total number of patent applications filed were 117,985, 125,931, and
131,403, respectively. Yet, the pendency times of average patent applications during the same
three year period were 25.0, 23.2, and 22.0 months, respectively. Id. These numbers represent
the "[a]verage time... between filing and issuance/abandonment of utility, plant, and reissue
applications (excluding designs)." Id. at n.8. See infra note 105 for discussion of patent appli-
cation "abandonment."
64. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1988). This statute requires the PTO to keep the information in a
patent application confidential and nonpublic until a patent is granted. See also 35 U.S.C.
§ 205 (1988) (This section gives the government statutory authority to refuse to disclose docu-
ments related to a pending patent in which the federal government may own an interest. This
section could probably be used to stifle a Freedom of Information Act (F.O.I.A.), 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1988), argument for disclosure.).
65. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
66. See supra note 63.
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granted.67 To reduce these concerns, the public must get a fair quid pro
quo for the patent monopoly. Free public access to information about
the invention is that quid pro quo.
1. Advantages of Software Patents
The inventor delivers public access to the information about the in-
vention in exchange for the patent monopoly.6" Thus, the patent laws
attempt to balance adequate incentive to invent against free public access
to information an inventor might otherwise withhold. This passing on of
knowledge that the patent system invites allows for advancement based
upon the information revealed in the patent. "The benefits of legal pro-
tection flow from the inventions that never would have occurred absent
the availability of protection and the discovery of certain inventions
sooner as a result of the availability of intellectual property rights."69
Because patent protection benefits the public, the patent system
should be made attractive to inventors so that they forgo other forms of
intellectual property protection, which are often less advantageous to the
public. For example, trade secret 70 protection theoretically endures for-
ever, whereas patent protection lasts at most seventeen years. 71 There-
fore, patent protection is more favorable for at least two important
67. Uneasiness about patents and the monopoly power they carry is not new. Thomas
Jefferson, who was heavily involved in the original implementation of the constitutional direc-
tive reproduced in the first sentence of this Note, felt that the monopoly rights obtained from a
patent were "embarrassing." See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1966); 5
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 47 (Ford ed. 1895); 6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
180-81 (Washington ed. 1895).
68. For discussion of the patent disclosure requirements, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-114, 154
(1988). Section 112 requires that "[t]he specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art ... to make and use the same."
69. Menell, supra note 35, at 1065.
70. The Restatement of Torts states that
[a] trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it .....
The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret .... [A] substantial element
of secrecy must exist, so that, except by the use of improper means, there would be
difficulty in acquiring the information.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939) (withdrawn in 1977) (For a discussion of
why § 757 was withdrawn, see the introductory note to Division Nine in the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS (1977), indicating that §§ 708-761 are still valid, and stating that the
Council of the American Law Institute decided that these materials should be omitted from
the Restatement (Second) of Torts because they were more properly suited for a restatement of
unfair competition and trade regulation).
71. Design patents provide monopoly protection for 14 years. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1988).
Plant patents endure for 17 years, as do utility patents. Id. §§ 154, 161. See infra note 92 for
more information about plant and design patents.
1990]
reasons. First, the shorter life span of a patent allows public use of the
invention sooner. Second, a patent allows greater public access to infor-
mation than does trade secret protection, which relies on lack of general
public knowledge for the protection to exist; by definition, the creator
must deny public access to the discovery."2
The proposals for change discussed in Part IV of this Note should
make the patent system more attractive to inventors.
2. Disadvantages of Software Patents
The potentially adverse costs of the patent system must also be con-
sidered.73 Since a patent provides its owner with monopoly rights,74
some fear that patents have the potential to restrict, rather than to pro-
mote, the use of new programming technology. 75 For example, in the
United States, it is not a misuse of one's patent to "refuse[ ] to license or
use any right to the patent.''76 The potential for such patent suppression
is bolstered by the fact that compulsory licensing is uncommon in the
United States.77
To alleviate this fear of suppression, perhaps the United States
should develop a system of compulsory licensing, which Congress could
model after existing systems.78 However, a discussion of whether such a
72. See supra note 70.
73. One author indicates that the costs of the availability of intellectual property rights
include
the[ir] inhibiting effects... on sequential innovation, the monopoly costs resulting
from legal protection, the widespread costs of keeping abreast of the property rights
of others, the increased transaction costs for those creators wishing to make use of
others' inventions (e.g., through licensing), and the administrative costs of the intel-
lectual property systems (e.g., the costs of determining whether a patent should be
granted, and the social costs of using the legal system to enforce intellectual property
rights).
Menell, supra note 35, at 1065.
74. A utility patent owner can, "for the term of seventeen years, ... exclude others from
making, using, or selling" the patented item. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
75. "[I]n light of the rapid sequential nature of technological advancement in the applica-
tion programming field, overbroad protection could ... chok[e] off later innovation." Menell,
supra note 35, at 1066 (emphasis added).
76. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (1988). But see id. § 102(g), which states that if one suppresses
an unpatented invention, it will not preempt a subsequent inventor from obtaining a patent.
This provision is undoubtedly meant to encourage inventors of patentable creations to seek
patents.
77. There are areas outside of the patent system where compulsory licensing does exist.
See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857(H-6) (1988); various compulsory license provisions
in copyright law, e.g., compulsory licenses affecting cable television (17 U.S.C. § 111(d)
(1988)), the production of phonorecords (id. § 115), jukeboxes (id. § 116(b)), and noncommer-
cial broadcasting (id. § 118).
78. For discussion of existing and proposed compulsory licensing in other countries, see
Goldsmith, Patent Protection for United States Inventions in the Principal European Coun-
tries-Existing Systems, 6 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 533, 535 (1965); Karjala, Lessons
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compulsory licensing system should be adopted in the United States is
beyond the scope of this Note.
The concern that intellectual property protection chills the diffusion
of technology79 may elevate form over substance for two reasons. First,
if the protection afforded is not overly expansive, the public can use the
specific patent claims as a starting point for "inventing around" the pat-
ented creation or for creating new ideas based on the knowledge gleaned
from the open disclosures in the patent. s0 "Inventing around" arguably
wastes resources, but there also exists the potential for further advance-
ment due to the ingenuity often involved in creating these alternatives.
Second, patent holders generally intend to profit from their creations.
Enabling them to do so is one of the purposes of intellectual property
protection.81 Inventors often enter into license and royalty arrangements
that allow extensive, if not full, use of a patented invention by others."2
The remainder of this Note discusses how current laws should be
changed to carve out an exception in the patent laws for computer pro-
grams. If a separate area of law were established to handle software pro-
From the Computer Software Protection Debate in Japan, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 53, 66, 68-69
(Japan is considering compulsory licensing in a scheme of legal protection for computer
software); Tanabe, Compulsory Licensing in Japanese Patent Law, 8 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.
& COPYRIGHT L. 42 (1977).
79. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 52, at 1340 ("legal protection for intellectual property
creates real costs to society... [, and] enlarging the scope of intellectual property protection
increases the losses due to monopolistic exploitation of innovations"); Rosenberg, Factors Af-
fecting the Diffusion of Technology, 10 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 3 (1972).
80. Members of the public have to be careful when "borrowing" from the patented inven-
tion, since
the doctrine of equivalents has been judicially created to ensure that a patentee can
receive full protection for his or her patented ideas by making it difficult for a copier
to manufacture around a patent's claims. In view of this doctrine, a copier rarely
knows whether his product 'infringes' a patent or not until a district court passes on
the issue.
Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 19 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
accord Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
81. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) ("The patent laws
promote [the progress of 'useful Arts'] by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an
incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and develop-
ment."); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encourage-
ment of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors .... "); see also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNO-
LOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 9-12 (1979).
The patent laws balance incentive to create and public interest in widespread availability
of new creations. The economic reward discussed above is considered a secondary purpose for
having the patent system. See supra note 60. The primary purpose is the disclosure of creative
insights to the public. See infra note 83.
82. Charging too much for such arrangements may violate laws in other areas, such as
antitrust or unfair competition. For further discussion, see Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Ex-
ploitation of the Patent Monopoly. An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 271 (1966).
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tection, and if this area incorporated the proposals set forth in Part IV of
this Note, several advantages should result. Software patents would
more effectively carry out their intended purpose of public disclosure to
stimulate advancement, 83 less suppression of technology would occur,
and the software industry's confidence in the patent system would
improve.
III
Beyond Subject Matter-Nonobviousness and the
Relevant Prior Art
Although a smattering of nonbelievers cling to their conviction that
computer programs are not patentable,84 the general consensus is that
software constitutes patentable subject matter. 85 Even if the reader re-
fuses to accept this proposition, the following analysis of nonobviousness
has merit. The nonobviousness considerations for patentability are
" 'wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a category of statu-
tory subject matter.' ,86
Software patents have seldom been challenged in the courts on any
basis other than that software is not proper statutory subject matter. The
recent district court cases holding that software is valid statutory subject
matter 87 do not otherwise rule on the validity of the patents. Therefore,
once one gets beyond the initial question of subject matter, "The case law
83. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607 ("disclosure of inventions... is one of the primary
purposes of the patent system"); Associated Plastics Cos., Inc. v. Gits Molding Corp., 182
F.2d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir. 1950) ("The primary purpose of our patent system is not reward of
the individual but the advancement of the arts and sciences. Its inducement is directed to
disclosure of advances in knowledge which will be beneficial to society; it is not a certificate of
merit, but an incentive to disclosure."); Bobertz v. General Motors Corp., 228 F.2d 94, 99 (6th
Cir. 1955) (quoting the part of Associated Plastics quoted supra this footnote), cert denied, 352
U.S. 824 (1956); Malta Mfg. Co. v. Osten, 215 F. Supp. 114, 119-20 (E.D. Mich. 1963) (quot-
ing the part of Associated Plastics quoted supra this footnote); cf Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d
1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("the obligation to disclose is not the principal reason for a patent
system; ... [t]he reason for the patent system is to encourage innovation" and to "advanc[e]
the useful arts").
84. See, e.g., Bender, New Reliance on Patents for Program-Related Inventions, White &
Case Intellectual Property Newsletter, May 1988, at 21, 26 ("the role patents can play in
protecting program-related inventions... appears to be... not generally recognized") (White
& Case law firm, New York, N.Y.).
85. See supra note 52.
86. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190 (1981) (5-4 decision) (quoting In re Bergy, 596
F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (emphasis deleted) (consolidation of two separate cases involv-
ing different patents, the Bergy patent and the Chakrabarty patent), vacated and dismissed as
moot sub. nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (dismissed as moot only as to
the Bergy patent)).
87. See supra note 58.
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still does not establish definitively what software is and what is not
patentable.""8
"[T]he ultimate question of patent validity is one of law." 9 When
these "beyond subject matter" challenges are before the courts, judges
attempting to resolve questions that relate to the other statutory require-
ments of usefulness, novelty, and nonobviousness 9 will initially have
scant applicable precedent upon which to base their decisions.91 This
could lead to fragmentation and confusion among district courts, espe-
cially since many judges lack technical expertise in software
patentability.
To address these concerns, the subject of software patents must be
broken down into its constituent components. First, the statutory re-
quirements for obtaining a utility patent must be considered.
A utility patent is one of the three currently available patent types92
and is the most common type obtained for software. 93 Even if the item
for which a utility patent is being sought constitutes patentable subject
matter,94 the item must also be found useful, novel, and nonobvious.95
The remainder of this Note deals with the last of the patent system's
88. G. DAVIS III, supra note 56, at 159.
89. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
90. See infra note 95 for further discussion of these statutory requirements for a utility
patent.
91. See Menell, supra note 52, at 1350 ("The standards for novelty, nonobviousness, and
usefulness with respect to computer programs are still relatively uncertain.").
92. 'In addition to utility patents, plant and design patents are also available.
Plant patents are statutorily defined at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1988). Patentable plants
include "cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings." Id. § 161. See also
28 U.S.C. § 1498(d) (1988) (actions against the United States for infringement of plant pat-
ents); id. §§ 1295, 1338 (detailing which courts have jurisdiction in plant patent actions).
Design patents are statutorily defined at 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173 (1988). See also id. § 289
(additional remedy for infringement of design patent).
Although similar, each patent type has slightly different requirements for eligibility and
provides slightly different monopoly rights.
93. See supra note 56 for examples of software utility patents that have been issued.
94. See supra note 4 for discussion of statutory subject matter for utility patents.
95. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (1988), respectively.
The federal statutes declare that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful pro-
cess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."
Id § 101 (emphasis added). This is referred to as the "useful requirement."
The "novelty requirement" provides as follows: "A person shall be entitled to a patent
unless... the invention was known or used by others... before the invention thereof by the
applicant .... " Id. § 102. Section 102 contains seven subsections detailing the novelty re-
quirement. Among other things, the reach of the U.S. patent laws outside of the U.S. is de-
scribed. Although the details of this section are irrelevant to the instant Note, the gist of all of
the subsections is that inventions must not have been previously anticipated.
The nonobviousness requirement, as contained in the federal patent statutes, provides as
follows:
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tripartite statutory requirements, nonobviousness. The PTO must deter-
mine the relevant and applicable prior art when determining the obvi-
ousness or nonobviousness of an invention,96 and the scope of this prior
art must be revamped in the area of software patents.
The remainder of Part III discusses the prior art aspect of the non-
obviousness requirement as it currently relates to software patents. This
background will make the legislative changes proposed in Part IV more
meaningful.
A. Prior Art, Problem Areas, and Computer Programs
This section points out some problems that could arise when present
concepts of prior art are applied to software patents. In the next section,
some ramifications of continued use of the present system are presented.
The concept of nonobviousness has been well developed in non-
software cases. Graham v. John Deere Co. 97 was the first Supreme Court
decision on patentability of inventions after Congress added the require-
ment that inventions be nonobvious to be patentable.9 The Court stated
that the basic question that must be resolved concerning nonobviousness
is "whether 'the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the
art to which said subject matter pertains.' "I" Graham established what
has become the traditional approach to answering this question. Under
this approach, the following factual inquiries are relevant:
* Scope and content of the prior art,
* Difference between the prior art and the claims at issue, and
A patent may not be obtained... if the differences between the subject matter sought
to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be nega-
tived by the manner in which the invention was made.
Id. § 103.
96. The PTO considers two types of prior art when reviewing a patent application. For
discussion of these, see infra note 117.
97. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
98. Id. at 3. Under the Patent Act of 1793, "novelty" and "utility" had been the sole
statutory prerequisites for a utility patent. Id. On January 1, 1953, the Patent Act of 1952,
which was the first complete revision of the patent laws since 1870, became effective and added
the nonobviousness requirement. See H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952); S.
REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952).
99. Graham, 383 U.S. at 13 (quoting the Patent Act of 1952; see 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988)).
In addition to presenting information about the tests for patentability, this case also provides
useful insights into the origin of the tests and the patent system itself. Justice Clark's opinion
presents both the statutory and the judicial evolution of patents.
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* Level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. l00
The first factual inquiry is of primary interest because the PTO has
difficulty determining what the prior art should encompass in fast-mov-
ing areas such as the software industry.
Under the traditional approach, a judge determines the relevant and
applicable prior art from a variety of sources, including expert testimony,
books, articles, prior patents, and other printed publications.1 °1 How-
ever, traditional notions of prior art, confidentiality of patent applica-
tions,12 and backlog at the PTO,1°3 coalesce into a problem for rapidly
changing technologies such as software.
Delays at the PTO are not detrimental for everyone. Although the
public suffers from slow dissemination of information, these same delays
may work to the advantage of the inventor who submits a patent applica-
tion. For example, during the patent pending period, the inventor can
determine if trade secret" 4 protection will suffice in lieu of patent protec-
tion. If the trade secret protection were working, the inventor could
abandon the application before the patent issued.105 By doing this, the
application's contents remain confidential, I"6 and the inventor maintains
the propriety of his creation. Although he forgoes monopoly rights by
going this route, ideally the inventor will maintain an advantage through
secrecy. The decision to pursue patent protection or maintain trade se-
cret protection involves weighing the advantages of monopoly protection
against those of secrecy and one's expectation that the creation can be
kept secret.
100. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. The following are some "secondary considerations" that are
often considered when a court attempts to resolve the obviousness or nonobviousness of an
invention:
* Commercial success of the invention,
* Long felt but unresolved need for such an invention,
" Failure of others to produce a similar invention.
Id.
101. For discussion of the nonobviousness requirement as it applied to software patent
applications before Diehr, see Note, Patentability of Computer Software: the Nonobviousness
Issue, 62 IOWA L. REV. 615 (1976).
Apparently no one has tried to impose some logical template over the prior decisions of
the Federal Circuit to predict how that court would apply its precedent to software patent
litigation.
102. See supra note 64.
103. See supra note 63.
104. See supra note 70.
105. An applicant can abandon (effectively cancel) a patent application any time before the
patent issues. There are various ways to abandon an application, including failure to submit
the required application fee and § 115 oath of first invention (35 U.S.C. § 111 (1988)), failure
to prosecute (id. § 133), or failure to pay the issue fee in a timely manner (id. § 151).
106. See supra note 64 for discussion of the confidentiality of pending patent applications.
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B. Ramifications of Using the Current, Inadequate Method of Determining
Prior Art
Current methods10 7 of handling the problem of determining prior
art are inadequate and present options that are neither practicable nor
economically sound. For example, after filing a patent application, an
inventor can suspend use of the invention until the patent is either
granted or denied. The inventor would then be certain not to infringe
someone else's patent while the inventor's application was pending. This
is also the only way for an inventor to be certain that his invention is not
going to infringe another pending patent which later issues. This route
ensures that a programmer with a pending patent application does not
invest large amounts of time and money in what might ultimately be an
infringing computer program. However, it is unwise to sit idle in the
fast-moving, computer software market. 108 To wait is to invite
premarketing obsolescence.
Under the present patent laws, when software inventors file patent
applications, it is unknown if their "new" programs will be preempted by
another program for which an application is already pending. Although
this dilemma faces all patent applicants, it is potentially more detrimen-
tal in areas of rapidly changing technology. In nonsoftware cases, an
inventor can carefully consider existing case law and then decide whether
to proceed despite potential litigation. Current confusion in the industry
about which software patents will be upheld in court is manifested by an
107. One method used to solve prior art problems is interference practice (35 U.S.C.
§§ 134, 135, 146, 291 (1988)), which occurs when the Commissioner finds a collision between
the claims in a patent application and those in another pending patent or an existing patent.
That is, interference occurs when a person claims a patent for the whole or any integral part of
the ground already covered by an existing patent or by a pending application. Philco Corp. v.
Radio Corp. of Am., 276 F. Supp. 24, 26 (D. Del. 1967). The Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences then reviews it. For further discussion of interference practice, see generally B.
BAKER, OUTLINE OF PATENT OFFICE INTERFERENCE PRACTICE (19th ed. 1977); M.
KLITZMAN, PATENT INTERFERENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE (1984); Calvert, An Overview of
Interference Practice, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y. 290 (1980).
Another method is reexamination. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1988). During this process, a pat-
ent's claims are reexamined in light of newly disclosed prior art that was not previously consid-
ered by the PTO. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.501-.570 (1989). A federal court may stay patent
litigation while the PTO reconsiders the scope or validity of the patent at issue in the litigation
in light of newly disclosed prior art. See 42 Fed. Reg. 5,588 (1977); Fisher Controls Co. v.
Control Components, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 581, 582 (S.D. Iowa 1977); see also Act of Dec. 12,
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 1, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 302 (1988) ("[a]ny person
at any time may file a request for reexamination by the [PTO] of any claim of a patent on the
basis of any prior art")); Dunner & Lipsey, The New Reissue Practice, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y.
68 (1979); Irons & Sears, Patent "Reexamination " A Case of Administrative Arrogation, 1980
UTAH L. REV. 287; Silverman, To Err is Human-Patent Reissues and the Doctrine of Inter-
vening Rights, 48 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y. 696, 727 (1966).
108. See supra note 62, discussing growth of the computer software market.
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apparent unwillingness to litigate the validity of software patents. 109
With an inadequate judicial decision-base for assessing the risks of litigat-
ing a software patent, few are volunteering to be litigation "guinea pigs."
Litigation generally clarifies legislation through judicial interpreta-
tion and opinion as applied to concrete situations. However, the present
lack of appellate court opinions leaves too much uncertainty and room
for judicial variation at the trial court level in the software patent area.
The mortality rate of patents that are tested by litigation is high,11° and
even less certainty exists in the emerging area of software patents. This
volatile state has made both the computer industry and the media skepti-
cal of the wisdom of software patents.Il" The following proposals would
eliminate much of this confusion by making it easier to understand what
software is and what is not patentable, so that people in the industry
could make more informed decisions. In addition, the proposals could
build confidence in the patent system's ability to protect software.
IV
Proposals for Change
Although it seeks to endure, the law remains flexible. When de-
mand is strong enough, exceptions are made. Congress has made excep-
tions to accommodate new technology in the past, and sui generis
109. Bender, Software Patents-The Other Shoe Drops, White & Case Intellectual Property
Newsletter, May 1989, at I (White & Case law firm, New York, N.Y.).
This confusion could be advantageous to litigants attempting to invalidate software pat-
ents. By pointing out that existing precedent for upholding software patents is sparse, they
may be able to convince a court that such patents should be invalidated.
110. See, e.g., G. DAVIS III, supra note 56, at 161 ("a high percentage of patents are de-
clared invalid in litigation"); Harlan & Skjerven, Patent Development Programs for High Tech-
nology Companies: Why to Have Them and How to Run Them, THE COMPUTER LAW., Jan.
1990, at 1, 2 ("A statistical review of decisions from 1966 through 1973 reported that only 31
percent of the patents reviewed by the U.S. courts of appeals were found valid. During the
same period in the U.S. district courts, only 38 percent were found valid.") (footnote omitted);
Kolata, supra note 38, § 4, at 26, col. 6 (80% of patents fail when tested in court). But see
Bender, supra note 84, at 24 ("[I]n the view of many, more pro-patent determinations" have
occurred since the creation of the Federal Circuit (see supra note 41 for more information
about this new U.S. court of appeals)); Harlan & Skjerven, supra this note, at 1 ("The recent
decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (C.A.F.C.) indicate that now patents
which are litigated are, statistically, more likely to be enforced than declared invalid."); Zim-
merman, Electronics Firms Mine Own Technology: Patent Pushing, San Francisco Examiner,
Oct. 14, 1990, at El, col. 3 ("According to [Richard] Whittington, ["an industry analyst with
Kidder, Peabody & Co.,"] in the 1960s and 1970s, patent-holders going to court lost about 80
percent of the time. Now, their success rate is 80 percent." Id. at E4, col. 3, with bracketed
quote from id. at E4, col. 1).
111. See supra note 61.
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intellectual property protection is currently available for some items." t 2
Therefore, new laws designed specifically for software are conceivable.
To this end, the current system of federal patent protection for
software should be modified. The following proposals suggest guidelines
for redefining the scope of what constitutes prior art in the area of
software patents to remedy some of the faults in the current system.
However, a completely new system of patent protection for software is
not proposed.
The proposals in this area are as follows:
Proposal 1. Independent Creation and Prior Art.
Independent creation by a subsequent filer of substantially
similar software during or before the patent pending period of a
prior filed patent application shall not constitute infringement.
In other words, pending patents shall not constitute prior art in
the software area, even if subsequently granted.
Proposal 2. Effect of Improper Copying.
If the subsequent filer who files a patent application on
substantially similar software had access to a prior filer's
software, and the prior filer proves by clear and convincing evi-
dence that actual copying occurred, no patent shall be issued to
the subsequent filer; and the subsequent filer's application shall
be of no further effect. This is true whether or not the prior
filer is ultimately issued a patent.
Most of the following definitions are self-explanatory; however, sev-
eral terms are defined to avoid ambiguity.
112. A special exception was made to the federal copyright laws by the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-
914 (1988)) (discussed in H.R. REP. No. 781, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 8-11 (1984)). Whereas
copyright protection is generally unavailable for useful items ("unless the shape ... contains
some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilita-
rian aspects .... the design would not be copyrighted under the bill." H.R. REP. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1976)), this exception allows such a copyright to be obtained, thereby
protecting semiconductor chips by a composite of patent and copyright type protection that
lasts 10 years (17 U.S.C. § 904(b) (1988)) from the date of registration or first commercial
exploitation, whichever occurs first. 17 U.S.C. § 904(a). Registration must be obtained within
two years of commercial exploitation anywhere in the world to avoid forfeiting protection. Id.
§ 908(a). For further discussion of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act from the point of
view of two of its legislative enactors, see Kastenmeier & Remington, The Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70 MINN. L. REv. 417 (1985).
Special exceptions have also been made to the federal patent laws. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C.
§§ 161-164 (1988) (plant patents). The patent rules dealing with plants are further discussed
infra in section IV(C).
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A. Some Definitions
A "nonfiler" is someone who does not file a patent application and
either relies on some other form of intellectual property protection or on
none at all.
A "prior filed patent application" is an application filed before at
least one other application but is not necessarily the first application filed.
A 'prior filer" is one who files a patent application before at least
one other applicant but is not necessarily the first to file an application.
A "subsequent filed patent application" is an application filed after
at least one other application but is not necessarily the last application
filed.
A "subsequent filer" is one who files a patent application after at
least one other applicant but is not necessarily the last to file an
application.
"Substantially similar software" should be defined using aspects of
developed case law' 13 to reduce confusion. One problem with this ap-
proach is that under current copyright law, where the "substantially sim-
ilar" test was developed, the test is inconsistently applied. The courts
disagree on whether noncopyrightable elements should be included or
excluded from the subject matter to be compared when checking for sub-
stantial similarity. Some courts remove the noncopyrightable elements
from the allegedly copied material before applying the test.'1 4 Other
courts have stated that, when determining substantial similarity, even the
elements of a work that would be ineligible for copyright protection if
standing alone should be considered.' 15 It is the latter view that is the
113. See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 654 F.2d 204, 208 (2d
Cir. 1981) ("The general test for determining substantial similarity is 'whether an average lay
observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted
work.' ") (quoting Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab.-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966)); 3 M.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] (1985).
114. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980) ("Ordinarily, wrongful appropriation is shown by proving a 'sub-
stantial similarity' of copyrightable expression.") (emphasis in original); Alexander v. Haley,
460 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (noncopyrightable commonplace scenes from an allegedly
infringing movie were removed from consideration before application of the substantial simi-
larity test).
115. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1936)
(L. Hand, J.) (noncopyrighted elements and copyrighted elements, "bound together in an in-
separable unity[,]" may both be considered when determining the similarity of two works);
Barris/Fraser Enters. v. Goodson-Todman Enters., Ltd., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1887 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (even noncopyrightable elements should be considered because their selection and ar-
rangement may have been infringed); cf Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos.,
720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983); Warner Bros., Inc., 654 F.2d at 208 ("Substantial similarity" is
determined by an "average lay observer" test. An average lay observer will be unable to distin-
guish copyrightable from noncopyrightable elements by merely observing an item.); Novelty
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most appealing approach to use when comparing software inventions and
should be adopted in a modified form.
Under sui generis protection, even the "nonpatentable" (as opposed
to "noncopyrightable") elements of the software should be considered
when looking for substantial similarity. This approach would simplify
the analysis, since the court would not have to separate out certain ele-
ments. It also would avoid concern over combination patents, which can
consist entirely of nonpatentable elements.'
16
B. Proposal 1: Independent Creation and Prior Art
1. What Presently Occurs
Currently, if two patent applications concerning related subject mat-
ter are pending at the same time, the first application filed is prior art"
17
to the second only if the first one is granted a patent. This is true because
a pending application is statutorily confidential until a patent is
granted;"18 therefore, it is illegal for the PTO to use it as prior art. Under
Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 (2d Cir. 1977) (" '[S]ubstantial
similarity' is to be determined by the 'ordinary observer' test." An ordinary observer will be
unable to distinguish copyrightable from noncopyrightable elements by merely observing an
item.); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1970)
("[P]roper analysis of the problem requires that all elements... be considered as a whole.")
(emphasis added).
116. See supra note 11.
117. This Note deals only with prior art as it is used to determine nonobviousness under 35
U.S.C. § 103 (1988). The prior art used to determine novelty under § 102 sweeps more
broadly since actual anticipation (Le., did the invention ever exist before?) is then the standard.
The § 102 novelty prior art considers everything, whether legally available or not. Even a
legally unavailable patent application is a valid source of prior art that must be taken into
account whether granted or not.
For the purpose of determining nonobviousness under § 103, only prior art that was le-
gally available at the time the invention was made should be considered. This should preclude
using pending, abandoned, or rejected patent applications as part of the applicable and relevant
prior art. This Note assumes that this is what actually occurs.
There is, however, some indication that the broader § 102 prior art (and in particular the
§ 102(e) prior art, which deals directly with the situation described in the previous paragraph)
has been used by the courts when ruling on the § 103 nonobviousness of an invention. See,
e.g., In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1290 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (§ 102(a), (b), (e), and (g) can be used to
define prior art for purposes of § 103); Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252
(1965). This practice of using constructive prior art for nonobviousness determinations seems
unreasonable since the information thus used may be unavailable to the public. It would be
impossible for a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made (the
hypothetical person against whom nonobviousness is tested) to consider the information.
Apparently, one concern of the courts is that delays in the PTO should not limit the
relevant § 103 prior art. See, e.g., Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S.
390, 401 (1926) ("The delays of the [PTO] ought not to cut down the effect of what has been
done."). However, Alexander Milburn may be inapplicable to nonobviousness since it was
decided before the 1952 Patent Act, which statutorily added the nonobviousness requirement.
118. See supra note 64.
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the proposed statutory changes, any prior pending software patent appli-
cation would not automatically preempt a subsequently filed application.
In other words, it would not automatically constitute prior art when
granted a patent.
Presently, if a subsequent filer markets the software invention while
his patent is pending (a practice that is likely because of the short life-
expectancy of most computer programs and the lag-time involved in the
patent application process), a prior filer has the opportunity to modify
the claims of his pending patent in an attempt to cover the subsequent
filer's invention.119 If the prior filer successfully modifies his application
and his patent is granted, he can attack the subsequent filer's invention
and possibly prevent its continued production. The changes proposed in
this Note would make such unfair tactics ineffective and would reduce
the need to resort to other legal theories.120
2. What Would Occur Under This Proposal
As a result of the above proposal, multiple patents for the same ba-
sic software invention could coexist if later patent applications were filed
while the first patent was pending. This may create headaches for the
courts, but the courts already deal with more complex issues. 121 On the
bright side, this potential for coexisting patents on substantially similar
software could allay some of the fears of software patent antagonists,
because monopolistic power would be diluted to duopolistic or even
oligopolistic power. By potentially reducing the strength of any one
party's control, products could compete on the open market and thereby
reduce the detrimental effect of complete monopoly control.
Since the PTO is currently required to keep the information con-
tained in a pending patent application confidential, 122 searching prior art
does not reveal potential conflicts between the invention sought to be
patented and any other invention for which a patent application is pend-
ing. Applications should still be kept confidential, but patent protection
should attach only when the patent issues; any retroactive effect should
119. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1988) allows the inventor to amend the claims in a pending patent
application. But, "[o]nce [a] patent issues, it is strictly construed [and] cannot be used to
secure any monopoly beyond that contained in the patent." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964) (citations omitted).
120. For example, state unfair competition laws may be used to the extent that they do not
contravene federal protection. Unfair competition laws may be used to prevent deceptive or
unfair conduct, but if these laws interfere with or are inconsistent with federal laws, the state
laws will be preempted by article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution (the supremacy
clause).
121. For example, large class action lawsuits or lawsuits involving foreign persons.
122. See supra note 64.
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be disallowed. Bona fide independent creation by a subsequent filer while
the patent application of a prior filer is pending should not be foreclosed.
Things happen rapidly in the software field. Consequently, if several
programmers create substantially similar software at about the same
time, the law should not penalize the programmer who attempts to pro-
tect a creation with a patent but unluckily files the patent application
slightly later than another programmer files.
This proposal is similar to the "independent creation privilege" that
already exists under copyright law.'2 3 It differs from copyright law in
that the privilege would end when the patent was issued, whereas in-
dependent creation is always a defense to an infringement action under
copyright law.1 24 This should spur inventors to submit patent applica-
tions promptly, while tempering the race to the patent office to obtain the
advantages of first-filer status. If more patent applications were filed,
more patents would be granted; and the public would gain from this in-
creased disclosure of creative insights. In addition, this proposal is con-
sistent with, and may be an extension of, the policy of construing patent
monopoly protection narrowly,125 which should ease its acceptance.
Since the primary purpose of this Note is to suggest what should
constitute prior art for software patent applications, the treatment of
nonfilers is not explored in detail. Whether a prior filer who receives a
patent should be able to enforce it against a nonfiler who independently
created a substantially similar piece of software during the patent pend-
ing period is not addressed in detail. However, use of the patent system
to bring innovative ideas to the public's attention should be encouraged.
Therefore, enforcement should be allowed against nonfilers.
C. Proposal 2: Effect of Improper Copying
This recommendation defines an exception to the previous rule,
which is similar to an exception that exists in the area of plant patents.
126
A plant patent owner can prevent the asexual reproduction of the pat-
ented plant, 127 but is powerless to prevent independent creation. 2s Re-
123. See, e.g., Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 150-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (L.
Hand, J.) (independent creation is a complete defense to copyright infringement).
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 310-11 (1948) ("patent
grants are to be construed strictly"); Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics
Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 17 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (In discussing the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972), the Federal Circuit
stated that one of the "strands of thought" applied in Deepsouth was "that the patent laws
must be construed strictly because they create a 'monopoly' in the patentee").
126. Plant patents are described in 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1988). See also id. § 41(a)(3).
127. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (1988).
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creating a software invention after having access to it is analogous to the
asexual reproduction of a plant since both require actual access to the
patented item. Therefore, the owner of a software patent should simi-
larly be able to prevent the "asexual reproduction" of his software, (i.e.,
direct piracy and cannibalization). However, like a plant patent owner, a
software patent owner should be unable to prevent all independent
creation.
The inability of a plant patent owner to prevent all independent cre-
ation is unique.129 This extensive limitation on plant patent owners
should not be applied in the software patent area, where the independent
creation privilege should be limited. 130 Under these proposals, the mo-
nopoly power to prevent independent creation would still exist, but
would only attach after the patent was granted. In other words, the mo-
nopoly effect would not retroactively invalidate a computer program pat-
ent, the application for which was filed during the first patent's pending
period.
Once the prior filer receives a software patent, the independent crea-
tion privilege should cease to absolve a subsequent creator who had not
filed a patent application before that time. As a result, the exception
would only vindicate inventors who actually filed their applications dur-
ing the prior filer's patent pending period. This exception should help
ensure that what is claimed as independently created software was actu-
ally independently created.
This proposed change also requires proof by clear and convincing
evidence. By requiring a stiff showing13 1 to defeat another's patent appli-
cation, fewer unsubstantiated claims should find their way into the ex-
pensive arena of patent litigation.
V
Conclusion
Currently, the copyright and patent systems are being used simulta-
neously to provide the most complete federal statutory protection for
128. For further discussion of plant patents, see generally, Magnuson, A Short Discussion of
Various Aspects of Plant Patents, 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y. 493 (1948); Recent Decisions, 61
MICH. L. REV. 997 (1963).
129. Generally, another inventor's independent creation of a patented device infringes the
patent. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478 (1974).
130. The independent creation privilege that should apply to software patents was dis-
cussed supra in section IV(B).
131. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 178 (5th ed. 1979) ("Except as otherwise provided by
law, the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence."). Preponderance
of the evidence is a lower standard of proof than proof by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at
227.
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software inventions. 132 Software is something of an anomaly among
copyrightable creations; and, although some commentators support
copyright protection for software, 133 this form of protection is only avail-
able by specific statutory exception. 34 Software is also somewhat out of
place in the current patent system.
The unique aspects of software have resulted in divergent views
among patent and copyright attorneys on what features of software
132. See Higgins, supra note 52, at 67-68 (Due to the literary and the technological compo-
nents of software, developers can obtain both copyright and patent protection for their
software.).
The potential for obtaining both forms of protection stems from In re Yardley, 493 F.2d
1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974). Before Yardley, the doctrine of election, which was judicially created
(see In re Blood, 23 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1927) and Korzybski v. Underwood & Underwood,
Inc., 36 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1929)) and subsequently codified (see 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1989)),
prevented one from obtaining both copyright and patent protection for the same item. If the
item qualified for both forms of protection, the creator had to elect one or the other. In Yar-
dley, a designer had a copyright on a watch and filed for a patent on it. The C.C.P.A. reversed
a rejection that had been based on the doctrine of election and held that design patents and
copyrights can both be used to protect the same work.
Since the PTO and the Copyright Office follow different rules, one must still obtain the
copyright protection first. Subsequent to Yardley, the PTO has allowed patents on copy-
righted items. However, the Copyright Office still adheres to the doctrine of election, so one
must obtain the copyright before the patent issues. "The potential availability of protection
under the design patent law will not affect the registrability of a pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
tural work, but a copyright claim in a patented design or in the drawings or photographs in a
patent application will not be registered after the patent has been issued." 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.10(a).
Although both copyright protection and a utility patent may be available for a software
invention, it is unlikely that the same feature of the computer program will be protected by
both areas of federal law. This stems from the fact that useful things cannot be protected by
copyright (see infra note 134), and usefulness is statutorily required for a utility patent (see
supra note 95 for discussion of the statutory requirements for a utility patent).
133. See, e.g., Clapes, Lynch & Steinbery, Silicon Epics and Binary Bards: Determining the
Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1493, 1583
(1987) ("copyright is ... an appropriate form of protection for computer programs"); Ras-
kind, supra note 33, at 1131 ("the criticisms of the existing scheme of copyright protection,
while valid in many respects, have not shown persuasively that copyright protection of
software should be abandoned"); Fisher, Software Industry in Uproar Over Recent Rush of
Patents, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1989, at Al, col. 5 (expressing concern that patents on "basic"
computer programs will stifle creative freedom). But see Menell, supra note 52, at 1372
("copyright protection is far from an ideal solution"); Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of
Intellectual Property: Applying the Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN.
L. REV. 471, 507 (1985) ("copyright law is not the proper vehicle for protection of computer
programs, and ... a sui generis approach is needed").
134. Software is generally useful, and useful creations are customarily not copyrightable.
See, e.g., Mislow, supra note 16, at 761-62; Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663,
727-28. But see Raskind, supra note 33, at 1144 ("the utilitarian character of software is not a
disabling condition for [copyright] protection"). Congress made a specific exception for
software in 1980 by amending § 117 of the Copyright Act of 1976 to clearly establish that
computer programs are copyrightable subject matter. Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10,
94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1988)).
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should be protected by which area of intellectual property law.135 Such
confusion warrants creating a sui generis form of protection for software
by combining the copyright and patent systems, and this is where the
suggestions discussed above could be applied. If proper care is taken to
"preserv[e] ... the balance between competition and protection reflected
in the [present] patent and copyright laws," 136 the resulting system
would obviate the need to draw such distinctions.
Although patent protection is potentially more powerful than copy-
right protection, the threshold requirements for a patent (usefulness,
novelty, and nonobviousness) 137 are concomitantly more difficult to
meet. Thus, the difficulty of obtaining a patent helps justify the monop-
oly power that a patent offers, and the most innovative ideas generally
require this greater reward. Some of the extended benefit that a patent
has over a copyright may be offset by the patent's shorter duration.
38
Displacing copyright protection for software with sui generis patent
protection could reduce litigation. Since copyrights are more easily ob-
tainable than patents, more people can copyright their software than can
patent it. 139 Inherent in the greater volume of programs that can be pro-
tected by copyright than by patent is the potential for more litigation to
settle copyright disputes than would be necessary under a system that
only allows patent-type protection. "In a world protecting only useful,
novel, and nonobvious programming elements, the programmer would
be free to build upon the functional aspects of the first program,""
which should reduce litigation. Also, since most software fills a utilita-
135. See generally Higgins, supra note 52, at 75 ("Intellectual property counsel find it very
difficult to give their clients definitive opinions on [software] copyright infringement, given the
current state of the law.").
136. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
137. See supra note 95 for further discussion of these statutory requirements.
138. A utility patent endures for 17 years (35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988)), whereas a copyright
lasts for either the life of the author (if the author is an identified natural person and did not
produce the work for hire) plus 50 years (17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988)), or 100 years after crea-
tion or 75 years after publication, whichever occurs first, if the item was a work for hire. Id.
§ 302(c).
The 17-year term of the utility patent monopoly is also subject to question in the software
area. Although 17 years is one of the shortest terms for which the intellectual property laws
provide protection, even this length of time may be excessive in such a dynamic area. See
Menell, supra note 52, at 1364, 1371 (stating that legal protection for software should have a
relatively short duration). For discussion of suggested time periods for software patents, see Y.
BRAUNSTEIN, D. FISCHER, J. ORDOVER & W. BAUMOL, ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
As APPLIED TO COMPUTER SOFTWARE AND DATA BASES (June 1977) (report for CONTU)
IV-1 to IV-58 (study of optimum duration for computer software protection).
139. See Higgins, supra note 52, at 69 ("copyright registrations are easily and quickly ob-
tained" and "inexpensive"); Menell, supra note 35, at 1083 ("the patent system is less likely to
extend protection to too many computer programs").
140. Menell, supra note 35, at 1082.
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rian function, the patent system is the most logical system to modify to
protect such works.
The proposed legislative changes to patent law's definition of prior
art, as it relates to software patents, draw from various branches of intel-
lectual property law. This use of familiar concepts should stimulate a
more willing acceptance by the bar.
